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THE POST-CRAWFORD RISE IN VOTER ID LAWS: A 
SOLUTION STILL IN SEARCH OF A PROBLEM 
David M. Faherty* 
It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which restricts those political 
processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable 
legislation, is to be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under the general 
prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment than are most other types of legislation. 
United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) 
[I]f a nondiscriminatory law is supported by valid neutral justifications, those 
justifications should not be disregarded simply because partisan interests may have 
provided one motivation for the votes of individual legislators. 
Crawford v. Marion County, 553 U.S. 181, 204 (2008) 
We are focused on making sure that we meet our obligations that we’ve talked 
about for years . . . .  Voter ID, which is gonna allow Governor Romney to win the 
state of Pennsylvania, [is] done.     
Pennsylvania House Majority Leader Mike Turzai (2012) 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Crawford v. Marion County Election Board1, the Supreme Court upheld 
Indiana’s voter identification law, which required registered voters to present 
government-issued photo identification at the polls.  Instead of applying heighted 
scrutiny to a law that had an effect on voter qualifications, the Court simply 
balanced the asserted state interest of protecting the integrity and reliability of 
elections by preventing voter fraud against the burden imposed on eligible voters 
who were prevented from voting because they did not possess the required form of 
photo identification.  Not persuaded by the fact that Indiana could not point to a 
single instance of voter fraud, or that significant hurdles existed for eligible voters 
in obtaining appropriate photo IDs, the Court upheld Indiana’s voter ID law.   
Five years since Crawford, evidence of significant voter fraud has yet to be 
uncovered in the United States, despite many concerted attempts to do so.2  
Nevertheless, voter ID laws continue to be an extremely polarizing issue.  
Proponents argue that without voter ID laws, there is no way to ensure the integrity 
of elections or voter confidence in the democratic process.3  Opponents appeal to 
the same values to argue against voter ID laws – that the integrity of elections and 
                                                                                                     
 * J.D. Candidate, 2014, University of Maine School of Law.  The Author would like to thank 
Professors Jim Friedman and Dmitry Bam for their valuable insights and the Maine Law Review staff for 
their hard work and support throughout this process. 
 1. 553 U.S. 181 (2008).   
 2. See Ivan Moreno, Republicans Look for Voter Fraud, Find Little, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Sept. 24, 
2012, 1:22 PM, http://bigstory.ap.org/article/republicans-look-voter-fraud-find-little; Stephanie Saul, 
Looking, Very Closely, for Voter Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2012/09/17/us/politics/groups-like-true-the-vote-are-looking-very-closely-for-voter-fraud.html. 
 3. See Moreno, supra note 2; see Saul, supra note 2.   
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voter confidence in the democratic process are severely limited when voter ID laws 
disenfranchise a significant portion of the electorate.4 
This Comment argues that the disparity in post-Crawford rulings on voter ID 
laws results from the failure of the Court in Crawford to articulate a clear standard 
of review that allows courts to take equal protection considerations into account 
when deciding whether to uphold or invalidate voter ID laws.  After surveying the 
landscape of post-Crawford decisions on state voter ID laws, this Comment argues 
that the balancing test articulated in Crawford is inherently unclear and should be 
abandoned in favor of a heightened form of scrutiny when reviewing state laws that 
impose new restrictions and voter qualifications.  As the quotes above illustrate, it 
is time for the Supreme Court to settle the issue of ensuring voting rights in the face 
of the rising number of state voter ID laws.   
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF FEDERAL RESTRICTIONS ON STATE VOTER 
DISENFRANCHISEMENT 
Although the right to vote is not expressly guaranteed in the United States 
Constitution, the Supreme Court has “often reiterated that voting is of the most 
fundamental significance under our constitutional structure.”5  The Supreme Court 
has applied the Fourteenth Amendment, which prohibits states from “deny[ing] to 
any person . . . the equal protection of the laws,”6 to voting.  In Harper v. Virginia 
Board of Elections,7 the Court explained that “once the franchise is granted to the 
electorate, lines may not be drawn which are inconsistent with the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”8  Furthermore, the Fifteenth Amendment 
expressly protects the right to vote from racial discrimination, providing that “[t]he 
right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the 
United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of 
servitude.”9 
Despite the Constitutional safeguards of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendments, “the blight of racial discrimination in voting . . . infected the 
electoral process in parts of our country for nearly a century.”10  After 
Reconstruction, many Southern states enacted ballot access measures specifically 
designed to prevent blacks from voting, notoriously instituting poll taxes, literacy 
tests, grandfather clauses, and property qualifications at the state and local levels.11  
Though race-neutral on their face, these measures were deliberately crafted to 
                                                                                                     
 4. See generally KEESHA GASKINS & SUNDEEP IYER, THE CHALLENGE OF OBTAINING VOTER 
IDENTIFICATION (Brennan Center for Justice ed., 2012); Nate Silver, Measuring the Effects of Voter 
Identification Laws, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2012, http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/07/15/ 
measuring-the-effects-of-voter-identification-laws; Thomas B. Edsall, Killing a Fly with a Bazooka, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2012, http://campaignstops.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/07/29/killing-a-fly-with-a-
bazooka. 
 5. Ill. State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 184 (1979). 
 6. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 7. 383 U.S. 663 (1966). 
 8. Id. at 665. 
 9. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1. 
 10. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966). 
 11. See, e.g., id. at 310-11; Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 679 F.3d 848, 853 (D.C. Cir. 2012).   
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severely limit the number of black voters.  For example, when literacy tests were 
enacted, “more than two-thirds of the adult [blacks] were illiterate while less than 
one-quarter of the adult whites were unable to read or write.”12  In addition, the 
Court in Katzenbach highlighted a key speech delivered by South Carolina Senator 
Ben Tillman as evidence that ballot measures enacted in the South were designed 
with the express purpose of disenfranchising blacks.13  Ultimately, the Supreme 
Court invalidated many of these laws on the grounds that they violated the 
Fifteenth Amendment,14 but many states were able to stay one step ahead of the 
courts “by passing new discriminatory voting laws as soon as the old ones had been 
struck down.”15  
Against this backdrop of “unremitting and ingenious defiance of the 
Constitution,”16 Congress passed the Voting Rights Act of 1965 pursuant to 
Congress’s authority to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment “by appropriate 
legislation.”17  The Voting Rights Act was intended to eliminate the “insidious and 
pervasive evil” of racial discrimination in voting,18 and jurisdictions covered by the 
Act needed to demonstrate that a proposed change “neither has the purpose nor will 
have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or 
color” in order for the change to take effect.19  Section 2 of the Voting Rights act 
prohibits voting practices or procedures that discriminate on the basis of race, 
color, or against language minority groups.20  Under the 1982 amendments to 
Section 2, state or local laws violate the Voting Rights Act if they have the effect of 
disadvantaging minority voters.21  Furthermore, Section 2 authorizes litigation 
challenging state or local actions that are alleged to violate the section.22   
In adopting the Voting Rights Act, Congress concluded that lawsuits 
challenging election procedures were not sufficient as a means of stopping 
discrimination in voting, because states often invented new and novel ways of 
disenfranchising minority voters.23  In response to this problem, Congress adopted 
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, which requires preapproval of any attempt to 
change “any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or 
procedure with respect to voting” in jurisdictions with a history of race 
                                                                                                     
 12. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 311.   
 13. At the South Carolina Constitutional Convention of 1895, Senator Ben Tillman explained the 
real aim of the new literacy test: “[T]he only thing we can do as patriots and as statesmen is to take from 
[the ignorant blacks] every ballot that we can under the laws of our national government.” Id. at 310 n.9 
(quoting JOURNAL OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 464 
(1895)).  
 14. Id. at 311-12 (collecting cases). 
 15. Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 140 (1976) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 94-196, at 57-58 
(1975)). 
 16. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 309. 
 17. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 2. 
 18. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 309. 
 19. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c(a) (2006). 
 20. Id. § 1973. 
 21. Erwin Chemerinsky, ‘Stakes are Enormous’ in Voting Rights Case, A.B.A. J. (Feb. 5, 2013), 
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/court_elects_to_take_another_look_at_the_voting_rights_act. 
 22. 42 U.S.C. § 1973a. 
 23. Chemerinsky, supra note 21.   
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discrimination in voting.24  The preapproval, or “preclearance,” must come either 
from the U.S. Attorney General, through an administrative procedure in the 
Department of Justice, or from a three-judge federal court in the District of 
Columbia through a request for a declaratory judgment.25   
The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of Section 5 in Katzenbach, 
and has continued to do so over subsequent Congressional reauthorizations.26  In 
the 2006 reauthorization, Congress found that without the continued protections of 
the Voting Rights Act, “racial and language minority citizens will be deprived of 
their opportunity to exercise their right to vote, or will have their votes diluted, 
undermining the significant gains made by minority voters in the last 40 years.”27  
In a landmark case28 last term, the Supreme Court weakened the Voting Rights Act 
by striking down Section 4’s current coverage formula.  Substituting its judgment 
on the nature and location of voter disenfranchisement in the United States for that 
of Congress, the Court held that Section 4 failed to account for positive 
developments29 in covered jurisdictions, “keeping the focus on decades-old data 
relevant to decades-old problems, rather than current data reflecting current 
needs.”30   
III. VOTING RIGHTS AND VOTER FRAUD: FEDERAL AND STATE APPROACHES 
A. The Federal Approach 
In Harper, the U.S. Supreme Court held that Virginia could not condition the 
right to vote in a state election on the payment of a poll tax of $1.50.31  The Court 
rejected the dissenters’ argument that a rational basis existed for the poll tax based 
on Virginia’s interest in promoting civic responsibility by “weeding out those 
[voters] who do not care enough about public affairs” to pay a small sum for the 
privilege of voting.32  The Court applied a stricter standard than the rational basis 
standard, concluding that a State “violates the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment whenever it makes the affluence of the voter or payment of 
any fee an electoral standard.”33  The Court used the term “invidious 
                                                                                                     
 24. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c(a). 
 25. Id.   
 26. See Lopez v. Monterey Cnty., 519 U.S. 9 (1996); City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 
156 (1980); Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526 (1973). 
 27. An Act to Amend the Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 109-246, § 2, 120 Stat. 577, 578 
(2006).   
 28. Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013). 
 29. The Court highlighted that in covered jurisdictions, voter turnout and registration rates now 
approach parity, blatant discriminatory evasions of federal decrees are now rare, and minority 
candidates now hold office at unprecedented levels.  Id. at 2625.  Furthermore, the Court attributed these 
great strides to the Voting Rights Act.  Id. at 2626.  Nevertheless, it held that the deterrent effect of 
Section 5 on covered jurisdictions could not be immune from judicial scrutiny, because “no matter how 
‘clean’ the record of covered jurisdictions, the argument could always be made that it was the deterrence 
that accounted for the good behavior.”  Id. at 2627.   
 30. Id. at 2629.    
 31. Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).   
 32. Id. at 684-85 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 33. Id. at 666. (majority opinion). 
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discrimination” to describe this type of equal protection violation, and held that the 
State’s conduct was invidious because it was irrelevant to the voter’s 
qualifications.34   
The Court later qualified the standard applied in Harper that even rational 
restrictions on the right to vote are invidious if they are unrelated to voter 
qualifications.  In Anderson v. Celebrezze,35 where an independent presidential 
candidate challenged the constitutionality of Ohio’s early filing deadline for 
independent candidates, the Court held that “evenhanded restrictions that protect 
the integrity and reliability of the electoral process itself” are not invidious and 
satisfy the Harper standard.36  Instead of using a “litmus test” approach that would 
neatly separate valid from invalid restrictions, the Court in Anderson concluded 
that a court must identify and evaluate the interests advanced by the state as 
justifications for the burden imposed by the voting restrictions.37  The balancing 
approach of Anderson has been used in subsequent election cases, including a case 
involving Hawaii’s prohibition on write-in voting.38   
In Burdick v. Takushi,39 where a registered voter challenged Hawaii’s 
prohibition on write-in voting, the Court applied the Anderson standard for 
“reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions” and upheld Hawaii’s prohibition 
despite the fact that it prevented a significant number of voters from participating 
in Hawaii elections.40  In Burdick, the Court reaffirmed Anderson’s requirement 
that a court evaluating a constitutional challenge to an election regulation weigh the 
asserted injury to the right to vote against the “‘precise interests put forward by the 
State as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule.’”41   
In Norman v. Reed,42 where a new political party sought to overcome a 
restriction on the use of its name to gain a place on a local ballot, the Court 
identified the burden Illinois imposed on a political party’s access to the ballot.  
After calling for Illinois to demonstrate a “corresponding interest sufficiently 
weighty to justify the limitation,” the Court concluded that the restriction was not 
justified by a narrowly drawn state interest of compelling importance.43   
In recent years, Congress has enacted legislation to help the states modernize 
their election procedures.  For example, the National Voter Registration Act of 
1993 (NVRA) establishes procedures aimed at both increasing the number of 
registered voters for federal elections and protecting the integrity of voting and 
elections.44  The NVRA requires applications for state-issued motor vehicle 
driver’s licenses to serve as voter registration applications.45  Furthermore, the 
NVRA also restricts the states’ ability to remove names from their lists of 
                                                                                                     
 34. Id. at 666-67. 
 35. 460 U.S. 780 (1983). 
 36. Id. at 788 n.9. 
 37. Id. at 789.   
 38. See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992).   
 39. Id.   
 40. Id. at 434 (quoting Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788).  
 41. Id. (quoting Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789).   
 42. 502 U.S. 279 (1992).   
 43. Id. at 288-89.   
 44. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973gg–1973gg -10 (2006). 
 45. Id. § 1973gg-3.   
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registered voters.46 
In addition, Congress enacted the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) at the 
urging of President Bush in the aftermath of Bush v. Gore47 and the 2000 general 
election.48  HAVA requires every state to create and maintain computerized 
statewide lists of all registered voters,49 and also requires the states to verify voter 
information contained in voter registration applications by either the applicant’s 
driver’s license number or the last four digits of the applicant’s social security 
number.50  In addition, HAVA requires voters who registered to vote by mail and 
who have not voted previously in a federal election to show either a form of current 
and valid photo identification or a copy of a current utility bill, bank statement, 
government check, paycheck, or other government document that shows the name 
and address of the voter.51   
B. A State Approach: Missouri 
Missouri provides an illustrative example of the state-based approach to 
analyzing voter identification laws pre-Crawford.  The Supreme Court of Missouri 
took up the issue after a statute was enacted in 2006 that required registered voters 
to present certain types of photographic identification issued by the state or federal 
governments in order to cast their ballots.52  To block enforcement of the law, 
known as Section 115.427, plaintiffs Kathleen Weinschenk and others sued the 
State of Missouri on the grounds that Section 115.427 interfered with the 
fundamental right to vote as protected by the constitutions of Missouri and the 
United States.53  Furthermore, Ms. Weinschenk and the others claimed that the law 
impermissibly required voters without photo identification, particularly low-
income, disabled, and elderly voters, to spend money on the necessary documents 
such as birth certificates in order to obtain the requisite photo identification.54  The 
trial court held that the law was unconstitutional because it violated Missourians’ 
right to vote and to equal protection of the laws, finding that the law unnecessarily 
burdened the right to vote of registered voters who would not be allowed to vote 
because they did not have a form of photo identification required by the law.55   
The Missouri Supreme Court fully agreed with the argument of the state that a 
compelling state interest existed in preventing voter fraud.56  The court, however, 
held that the evidence presented to the trial court did not support the state’s 
argument that the law’s photo identification requirement was narrowly tailored to 
                                                                                                     
 46. Id. § 1973gg-6(a)(3).   
 47. 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam).   
 48. Help America Vote Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1666 (2002). 
 49. 42 U.S.C. § 15483(a) (2006).   
 50. Id. § 15483(a)(5)(A)(i).   
 51. Id. § 15483(b)(2)(A)(i).   
 52. Weinschenk v. State, 203 S.W.3d. 201, 204 (Mo. 2006) (per curiam). 
 53. Id.  The right to vote is expressly guaranteed to citizens who are qualified and registered under 
Article I, Section 25 and Article VII, Section 2 of the Missouri Constitution.   
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
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accomplish that purpose.57  The court’s holding was prompted by the state’s 
acknowledgement that the photo identification requirement was intended to prevent 
only impersonation at the polls, and would not affect fraud committed during 
absentee ballot submission or voter registration.58  Furthermore, the evidence 
presented at the trial court showed that the Missouri Legislature’s enactment in 
2002 of statutory precautions in response to HAVA sufficiently eliminated the 
potential risk of voter impersonation fraud.59   
Finally, the state argued that the photo identification requirement nevertheless 
should remain in place because it would reassure voters who perceived that fraud 
existed.60  In response, the Missouri Supreme Court held that this justification 
placed too great an encumbrance on Missourians’ right to vote given the complete 
absence of even a single report of voter impersonation in Missouri since the state’s 
implementation of the HAVA reforms.61   
Because the statute placed a substantial burden on the fundamental right to 
vote, the Missouri Supreme Court applied strict scrutiny to Missouri’s voter ID 
law.62  In applying strict scrutiny, the court held that the law was neither strictly 
necessary nor narrowly tailored to meet the state’s compelling interests,63 and thus 
violated equal protection and the fundamental right to vote in Missouri.64 
C. Crawford and the Development of a Balancing Test 
In Crawford, a majority of the Court agreed that Burdick rejected the argument 
that strict scrutiny applies to all laws imposing a burden on the right to vote.65  
However, the Stevens Plurality and the Scalia Concurrence disagreed over the 
legacy of Burdick.66  Justice Stevens argued that the Court in Burdick rejected the 
argument that strict scrutiny applies to all laws imposing a burden on the right to 
vote, and instead applied the “flexible standard” set forth in Anderson.67  Justice 
Scalia argued that Burdick created a novel “deferential ‘important regulatory 
interests’ standard.”68  
In Crawford, the plurality agreed that two state interests identified by Indiana 
were “unquestionably relevant to the State’s interest in protecting the integrity and 
reliability of the electoral process.”69  The plurality identified that the first state 
                                                                                                     
 57. Id.  
 58. Id. at 204-05. 
 59. Id. at 205.  The Missouri Supreme Court noted that the only specific instance of possible voter 
fraud that had occurred since the enactment of HAVA legislation involved an attempt by a person who 
had voted absentee to then vote in person.  Furthermore, this one instance of attempted voter fraud 
would not have been prevented by Missouri’s photo identification law.  Id.   
 60. Id.   
 61. Id.   
 62. Id. at 215. 
 63. Id. at 217. 
 64. Id. at 221-22. 
 65. See Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 190 n.8 (2008); id. at 204 (Scalia, J., 
concurring). 
 66. See id. at 190 n.8 (plurality opinion).   
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 204 (Scalia, J., concurring).  
 69. Id. at 191 (plurality opinion). 
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interest was in deterring and detecting voter fraud.70  Indiana argued that it had an 
interest in preventing voter fraud in response to the problem that the state’s voter 
registration rolls included a large number of names of persons who were either 
deceased or who no longer lived in Indiana.71  In addition, Indiana argued that it 
had an interest in safeguarding voter confidence.72   
The Stevens Plurality then turned to discuss each of these state interests.  After 
pointing to the implementation of federal statutes such as the NVRA and HAVA, 
the plurality inferred that Congress seemed to believe that “photo identification is 
one effective method of establishing a voter’s qualification to vote,” and that “the 
integrity of elections is enhanced through improved technology.”73  The plurality 
also emphasized that this conclusion was supported by a report published by the 
Commission on Federal Election Reform,74 which stated that “some form of 
identification is needed” at the polls because the United States is no longer a 
country where “everyone knows each other.”75  The plurality also highlighted the 
following findings and conclusions made in the report:  
There is no evidence of extensive voter fraud in U.S. elections or of multiple 
voting, but both occur, and it could affect the outcome of a close election.  The 
electoral system cannot inspire public confidence if no safeguards exist to deter or 
detect fraud or to confirm the identity of voters.  Photo [identification cards] 
currently are needed to board a plane, enter federal buildings, and cash a check.  
Voting is equally important.76   
The plurality next discussed the state interest of preventing voter fraud, and 
commented that the only kind of voter fraud that Indiana’s voter identification law 
addressed was in-person voter impersonation at polling places.77  Nevertheless, the 
plurality then stated that “[t]he record contains no evidence of any such fraud 
actually occurring in Indiana at any time in its history.”78   
The Stevens Plurality assumed the petitioners’ premise that the voter 
identification law “may have imposed a special burden” on some voters, but held 
that the petitioners did not assemble sufficient evidence to show that the special 
burden was severe enough to warrant heightened scrutiny.79  In reviewing the 
provisions of the Indiana law, the Court held that “[t]he severity of [the] burden is, 
of course, mitigated by the fact that, if eligible, voters without photo identification 
may cast provisional ballots that will ultimately be counted . . . [if] they travel to 
the circuit court clerk’s office within 10 days to execute the required affidavit.”80   
                                                                                                     
 70. Id.   
 71. Id.   
 72. Id.   
 73. Id. at 193. 
 74. The Commission on Federal Election Reform was co-chaired by former President Jimmy Carter 
and former Secretary of State James A. Baker III.   
 75. Crawford, 553 U.S. at 193-94 (quoting COMM’N ON FED. ELECTION REFORM, BUILDING 
CONFIDENCE IN U.S. ELECTIONS (2005)).   
 76. Id. at 194. 
 77. Id.   
 78. Id.   
 79. Id. at 199-200. 
 80. Id. at 199. 
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Although a narrow ruling on the validity of a single state’s voter ID law, 
Crawford nevertheless defined the parameters from which proponents and 
opponents of voter ID laws would base their arguments in legal challenges that 
followed.  For example, the Court held that “for most voters . . . the inconvenience 
of making a trip to the BMV [to obtain photo identification] . . . does not qualify as 
a substantial burden on the right to vote, or even represent a significant increase 
over the usual burdens of voting.”81  In addition, because Indiana’s law allowed 
eligible voters without the appropriate identification to sign an affidavit attesting to 
their identity as a registered Indiana voter, the holding of Crawford is necessarily 
limited to voter ID laws that allow for such alternative voting opportunities for 
voters who lack the appropriate identification on election day.   
IV. RECENT STATE ACTIONS TO PREVENT VOTER FRAUD 
A. Pennsylvania 
On March 14, 2012, the Pennsylvania Legislature passed a law (“Act 18”) 
requiring citizens voting in-person on election day to present photo identification.82  
Made effective immediately, Act 18 changed Pennsylvania’s Election Code83 by 
eliminating the distinction between photo identification and other forms of 
acceptable identification by defining the term “proof of identification” as a list of 
attributes of acceptable forms of photo identification.84  Act 18 also eliminated the 
option for electors without photo identification to present an alternative form of 
                                                                                                     
 81. Id. at 198. 
 82. Act of March 14, 2012, P.L. 195, No. 18, 2012 Pa. Legis. Serv. 2012-18 (West) (amending the 
definition of “proof of identification” in the Penn. Election Code) [hereinafter Act 18].   
 83. 25 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 2600-3591. 
 84. Act 18, 2012 Pa. Legis. Serv. 2012-18.  Act 18 defines “proof of identification” as the 
following:  
“(1) In the case of an elector who has a religious objection to being photographed, a 
valid-without-photo driver's license or a valid-without-photo identification card issued by 
the Department of Transportation. 
(2) For an elector who appears to vote under section 1210, a document that: 
(i) shows the name of the individual to whom the document was issued and the name 
substantially conforms to the name of the individual as it appears in the district register; 
(ii) shows a photograph of the individual to whom the document was issued;  
(iii) includes an expiration date and is not expired, except: 
(A) for a document issued by the Department of Transportation which is not more than 
twelve (12) months past the expiration date; or 
(B) in the case of a document from an agency of the Armed forces of the United States or 
their reserve components, including the Pennsylvania National Guard, establishing that 
the elector is a current member of or a veteran of the United States Armed Forces or 
National Guard which does not designate a specific date on which the document expires, 
but includes a designation that the expiration date is indefinite; and 
(iv) was issued by one of the following:  
(A) The United States Government.  
(B) The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.  
(C) A municipality of this Commonwealth to an employee of that municipality.  
(D) An accredited Pennsylvania public or private institution of higher learning.  
(E) A Pennsylvania care facility. 
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identification showing the name and address of the elector.85  In addition, Act 18 
required the Secretary of the Commonwealth to disseminate information to the 
public regarding the new photo identification requirement, and further required the 
Department of Transportation to issue a free identification card to any registered 
elector who applies and who includes an affirmation that he or she does not possess 
photo identification.86  Despite the claims by proponents in the Pennsylvania 
Legislature that Act 18 was meant to help curb voter fraud in the state, Republican 
State House Majority Leader Mike Turzai openly suggested that the real intent of 
the law was to aid the Republican Party politically.87  In response, several 
individuals and organizations filed a suit against the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania seeking a preliminary injunction of the enforcement and 
implementation of Act 18.88   
In the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, opponents of Act 18 issued a 
facial challenge by claiming that Act 18 violated the Pennsylvania Constitution in 
the following three ways: (1) by unduly burdening the fundamental right to vote in 
violation of Article I, Section 5; (2) by imposing unequal burdens on the right to 
vote upon voters in violation of the equal protection guarantees of Article I, 
Sections 1 and 26; and (3) by imposing an additional qualification on the right to 
vote in violation of Article VII, Section 1.89  To prevail in the trial court, the 
opponents of Act 18 carried the burden of establishing all of the requirements of a 
preliminary injunction.90  The Commonwealth Court held that the opponents of Act 
18 failed to establish the following requirements of a preliminary injunction: (a) 
that immediate and irreparable harm would result from the implementation of Act 
18, because they failed to establish that “disenfranchisement was immediate or 
inevitable;”91 (b) that greater injury would occur from refusing to grant the 
injunction than from granting it, because the public outreach and education 
components of implementation of Act 18 were much harder to start or restart than 
                                                                                                     
 85. Id.  The alternative forms of acceptable non-photo identification included the following: “(1) 
nonphoto identification issued by the Commonwealth, or any agency thereof; (2) nonphoto 
identification issued by the United States Government, or agency thereof; (3) a firearm permit; (4) a 
current utility bill; (5) a current bank statement; (6) a paycheck; [or] (7) a government check.”  Id.   
 86. Id.   
 87. Kelly Cernetich, Turzai: Voter ID Law Means Romney Can Win PA, POLITICS PA (June 25, 
2012, 12:53 PM), http://www.politicspa.com/turzai-voter-id-law-means-romney-can-win-pa/37153/ (In 
a speech at a Republican State Committee meeting, Turzai said: “We are focused on making sure that 
we meet our obligations that we’ve talked about for years. . . . Voter ID, which is gonna allow Governor 
Romney to win the state of Pennsylvania, [is] done.”).    
 88. Applewhite v. Commonwealth, No. 330 M.D. 2012, 2012 WL 3332376, at *1 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 
Aug. 15, 2012), vacated, 54 A.3d 1 (Pa. 2012).   
 89. Id.   
 90. Id. at *3. The elements of a preliminary injunction include the following:  
(1) relief is necessary to prevent immediate and irreparable harm that cannot be 
adequately compensated by money damages; (2) greater injury will occur from refusing 
to grant the injunction than from granting it; (3) the injunction will restore the parties to 
their status quo as it existed before the alleged wrongful conduct; (4) the petitioner is 
likely to prevail on the merits; (5) the injunction is reasonably suited to abate the 
offending activity; and, (6) the public interest will not be harmed if the injunction is 
granted.   
Id. (citing Brayman Constr. Corp. v. Dep't of Transp., 13 A.3d 925, 935 (Pa. 2011)). 
 91. Id.   
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to stop;92 and (c) that the opponents of Act 18 would likely prevail on the merits.93   
In analyzing the likelihood that the opponents of Act 18 would prevail, the 
Commonwealth Court favored the more deferential “flexible standard” approach 
set forth in Anderson and applied in Crawford over the “strict scrutiny” approach 
advocated by the opponents of Act 18.94  The court used the “flexible standard” 
approach of balancing the burdens against the legitimate state interest, and held that 
Act 18 on its face does not “expressly disenfranchise or burden any qualified 
elector or group of electors,” but instead “applies equally to all qualified voters 
[because] to vote in person, everyone must present a photo ID95 that can be 
obtained for free.”96  For purposes of the preliminary injunction, the court 
concluded that Act 18 imposed “only a limited burden on voters’ rights, and the 
burden [did] not outweigh the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.”97   
In reaching this conclusion, the court examined the Commonwealth’s stated 
justifications for the photo ID law, which were to “improve the security and 
integrity of elections in Pennsylvania in a manner that [was] in keeping with the 
photo ID requirements of many other secure institutions and processes,” and to use 
the photo ID requirement as “a tool to detect and deter voter fraud.”98  However, 
the Commonwealth had stipulated that despite these stated justifications, it did not 
know of any incidents, investigations, or prosecutions of in-person voter fraud in 
Pennsylvania or in any other states.99  Nevertheless, the court held that the absence 
of proof of in-person voter fraud in Pennsylvania was not dispositive.100  Thus, the 
court concluded that Act 18’s photo ID requirement was “a reasonable, 
nondiscriminatory, non-severe burden when viewed in the broader context of the 
                                                                                                     
 92. Id. at *5. 
 93. Id. at *6. 
 94. Id. at **16-17; see Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 190 n.8 (2008).   
 95. The Commonwealth Court based its prediction that qualified electors would not be 
disenfranchised by Act 18 on “the believable testimony about the pending [Pennsylvania Department of 
State] photo IDs for voting, and the enhanced availability of birth confirmation through the Department 
of Health for those born in Pennsylvania.”  Id. at *4. 
 96. Id. at *9. 
 97. Id.   
 98. Id. at *27.   
 99. Id. at *28.  Both the Commonwealth and the opponents of Act 18 stipulated to the following 
facts:  
1. There have been no investigations or prosecutions of in-person voter fraud in 
Pennsylvania; and the parties do not have direct personal knowledge of any such 
investigations or prosecutions in other states;  
2. The parties are not aware of any incidents of in-person voter fraud in Pennsylvania and 
do not have direct personal knowledge of in person voter fraud elsewhere;  
3. [The Commonwealth] will not offer any evidence in this action that in-person voter 
fraud has in fact occurred in Pennsylvania or elsewhere; . . .  
5. [The Commonwealth] will not offer any evidence or argument that in person voter 
fraud is likely to occur in November 2012 in the absence of the Photo ID law 
Id. 
 100. Id. The court also considered the comments of House Majority Leader Mike Turzai, determining 
that the evidence did not invalidate the interests supporting Act 18 because the statement was made 
away from the chamber floor of the General Assembly and because “if a nondiscriminatory law is 
supported by valid neutral justifications, those justifications should not be disregarded simply because 
partisan interests may have provided one motivation for the votes of individual legislators.”  Id. (quoting 
Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 204 (2008)). 
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widespread use of photo ID in daily life,” and that “[t]he Commonwealth's asserted 
interest in protecting public confidence in elections [was] a relevant and legitimate 
state interest sufficiently weighty to justify the burden.”101   
On appeal, the opponents of Act 18 reasserted their facial constitutional 
challenge to the law and sought to preliminarily enjoin its implementation, arguing 
that due to limitations in the Commonwealth’s identification card issuing 
infrastructure,102 a number of qualified Pennsylvania electors would not have had 
an adequate opportunity to become educated about Act 18’s requirements and 
obtain the necessary identification cards, and would thus be disenfranchised in the 
upcoming November 2012 general election.103  In reviewing the opinion of the 
Commonwealth Court, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that the lower 
court’s predictive judgment rested primarily on the assumption that the 
Commonwealth’s efforts both to educate the voting public and to compensate for 
the barriers to receiving identification cards from the Pennsylvania Department of 
Transportation would sufficiently prevent the possibility of disenfranchisement.104  
Given the state of affairs at the time of the appeal, the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania vacated the lower court’s order and remanded for the court to 
determine whether the Commonwealth’s procedures for issuing alternative 
identification cards comported with the requirement of Act 18’s “liberal access” 
requirement.105  If these procedures did not meet the liberal access requirement, the 
Supreme Court held that the Commonwealth Court was obligated to enter a 
preliminary injunction.106   
On remand, the Commonwealth Court held that the Commonwealth’s 
proposed changes did not cure the deficiency in the liberal access requirement of 
Act 18.107  After reviewing evidence108 on the number of photo identification cards 
issued to date, the court explained that it was no longer convinced of its predictive 
judgment that no voter disenfranchisement would result from the Commonwealth’s 
                                                                                                     
 101. Id. at *29. 
 102. On appeal, the Commonwealth conceded that Act 18 was not being implemented according to 
its terms, due to inconsistencies between the law’s requirements for ID applications and the higher 
standard that the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation requires for its ID applications.  In 
addition, the Pennsylvania Departments of State and Transportation acknowledged that under the 
current regime, some registered voters will not be able to qualify for a Department of Transportation 
identification card in time for the 2012 General Election.  Finally, officials from the Departments of 
State and Transportation testified that if the law was enforced “in a manner that prevents qualified and 
eligible electors from voting, the integrity of the upcoming General Election [would] be impaired.”  
Applewhite v. Commonwealth, 54 A.3d 1, 3-4 (Pa. 2012). 
 103. Id. at 4. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 5.  The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania also instructed the Commonwealth Court that it 
may not base its predictive judgment merely on the assurances of government officials.  Id.   
 106. Id.   
 107. Applewhite v. Commonwealth, No. 330 M.D.2012, 2012 WL 4497211, at *2 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 
Oct. 2, 2012). 
 108. As of September 25, 2012, between 9,300 and 9,500 Department of Transportation voting IDs 
and between 1,300 and 1,350 Department of State voting IDs had been issued.  According to 
Department of Transportation statistics, the period of March 2012 to September 2012 showed only a 
slight increase in the number of initial drivers’ licenses and initial photo IDs issued in Pennsylvania than 
over the same period in 2011.  Id. 
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implementation of Act 18 for the 2012 general election.109  Accepting the 
opponents of Act 18’s argument that the gap between the photo IDs issued and the 
estimated need would not be closed in the remaining five weeks before the election, 
the Commonwealth Court preliminarily enjoined the implementation of Act 18’s 
photo identification requirement for the 2012 general election.110   
B. Wisconsin 
In 2011, Wisconsin enacted a voter identification law (“Act 23”) mandating 
that qualified electors display acceptable government-sanctioned photo 
identification either at the polls or to election officials by 4:00 p.m. on the Friday 
after election day.111  To accommodate qualified electors who did not have photo 
identification, the legislature required the Department of Transportation to issue 
free photo identification cards to qualified electors.112  Two separate legal actions 
were filed simultaneously in response, challenging the implementation of the law 
both generally and specifically for the forthcoming 2012 general election.113   
In League of Women Voters,114 the Dane County Circuit Court permanently 
enjoined implementation of Act 23’s photo ID requirement.115  That court held that 
Act 23 was unconstitutional because it disqualified otherwise qualified electors 
from voting, a violation of the Wisconsin Constitution, which specifies that 
“[e]very United States citizen . . . who is a resident of an election district in this 
state is a qualified elector in that district.”116  Under the state constitution, the 
government may exclude from voting only those either (a) convicted of a felony, or 
(b) adjudged by a court to be incompetent to understand the objective of the 
elective process.117  While recognizing that the legislature had the power to regulate 
the mode, manner, and timing of the electoral process, the court stated that the 
legislature did not have the right to destroy or substantially impair the right of a 
qualified elector to cast his or her ballot.118  The court held that Act 23 was 
unconstitutional because its photo ID requirements were not merely elections 
regulations but “impermissibly eliminate[d] the right of suffrage altogether for 
certain constitutionally qualified electors.”119   
In Milwaukee Branch of the NAACP,120 the Dane County Circuit Court issued 
                                                                                                     
 109. Id. at *3. 
 110. Id. at **2-3. 
 111. Act of May 25, 2011, 2011 Wisconsin Act 23, §§ 18, 90, 2011-2012 Wis. Legis. Serv. Act 23 
(2011 A.B. 7) (West) (creating, amending, repealing, and renumbering statutes related to voter 
identification requirements). 
 112. Id. §138.   
 113. League of Women Voters of Wis. Educ. Network, Inc. v. Walker, No. 11 CV 4669, 2012 WL 
763586 (Wis. Cir. Mar. 12, 2012); Milwaukee Branch of the NAACP v. Walker, No. 11 CV 5492, 2012 
WL 739553 (Wis. Cir. Mar. 6, 2012). 
 114. 2012 WL 763586. 
 115. Id. at *5. 
 116. Id.; WIS. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
 117. WIS. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
 118. League of Women Voters, 2012 WL 763586, at *3. 
 119. Id. at *4.   
 120. Milwaukee Branch of the NAACP v. Walker, No. 11 CV 5492, 2012 WL 739553 (Wis. Cir. Ct. 
Mar. 6, 2012). 
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a temporary injunction against the enforcement and implementation of the photo 
identification requirements of Act 23.121  The court based its decision on the 
probability of success of the plaintiff’s argument that the photo ID requirements 
violated the Wisconsin Constitution by unreasonably burdening the right to vote 
and denying substantive due process and equal protection.122  The court held that 
because the right to vote is a fundamental interest in Wisconsin, the court should 
apply “a strict or heightened standard of review to determine [if Act 23] remains 
within that range of authority permitted under the constitution.”123  The court held 
that the sweep and impact of Act 23 was very broad, and had not been “sufficiently 
focused to avoid needless and significant impairment of the right to vote.”124   
In addition, the court offered three reasons why Crawford did not control the 
case’s outcome.  First, the court held that Wisconsin’s Constitution, unlike the 
United States Constitution, expressly guaranteed the right to vote.  Second, the 
court held that the Indiana law in Crawford was less rigid than Act 23 because it 
allowed for alternative voting opportunities for voters who lacked photo ID.  Third, 
the court held that while Crawford came to the Court based upon a flawed factual 
record lacking substantial evidence of voter disenfranchisement, this case did not 
suffer from the same inadequacy.125   
The State of Wisconsin appealed both cases, which were both certified for 
appeal by the Wisconsin Court of Appeals.126  However, the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court denied both petitions for appeal.127  Thus, the photo identification 
requirements of Act 23 were invalidated, and Wisconsin voters do not need to 
display a photo ID to gain access to the polls.     
C. Texas 
On May 27, 2011, Texas passed Senate Bill 14 (“SB 14”) requiring photo 
identification at the polls.  However, because Texas was a jurisdiction covered by 
section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, Texas needed to obtain preclearance from either 
the United States Attorney or a three-judge panel of the D.C. Federal District Court 
before it could implement any changes to its voting procedures.128  To obtain 
preclearance, Texas needed to demonstrate that SB 14 “neither has the purpose nor 
will have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race[,] 
color,” or “member[ship] [in] a language minority group.”129  Section 5 of the 
Voting Rights Act prohibits covered states from implementing voting laws that will 
                                                                                                     
 121. Id. at *7.   
 122. Id.   
 123. Id. at *5.   
 124. Id. at *6.   
 125. Id.  Plaintiffs submitted evidence that 221,975 eligible Wisconsin voters did not possess photo 
identification.  Id. at *2.   
 126. League of Women Voters of Wis. Educ. Network, Inc. v. Walker, No. 2012AP584, 2012 WL 
1020229 (Wis. Ct. App. 2012), cert. denied, 811 N.W.2d. 821 (Wis. 2012); Milwaukee Branch of the 
NAACP v. Walker, No. 2012AP557-LV, 2012 WL 1020254 (Wis. Ct. App. 2012), cert. denied, 811 
N.W.2d. 821 (Wis. 2012). 
 127. League of Women Voters of Wisconsin Education Network, Inc. v. Walker, 811 N.W.2d. 821 
(Wis. 2012); Milwaukee Branch of the NAACP v. Walker, 811 N.W.2d. 821 (Wis. 2012).   
 128. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c(a) (2006). 
 129. Id. §§ 1973c(a), 1973b(f)(2). 
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have a retrogressive effect on racial minorities.  Furthermore, the covered 
jurisdiction bears the burden of proof, which means that it must show by a 
preponderance of the evidence that a proposed voting change lacks both 
discriminatory purpose and retrogressive effect.130   
Replacing less stringent Texas voting laws, SB 14 required in-person voters to 
identify themselves at the polls using one of five approved government-issued 
forms of photo identification.131  SB 14 also prohibited the use of photo IDs that 
have expired more than sixty days before being presented at the polls.132  Voters 
who did not have an acceptable form of photo ID under SB 14 were able to obtain 
at the Texas Department of Public Safety a photographic “election identification 
certificate” (“EIC”), a pocket-sized card that resembles a driver’s license, for use at 
the polls.133  Furthermore, SB 14 made EICs available at the Texas Department of 
Public Safety free of charge.  However, because voters needed to spend money 
both to travel to the nearest Department of Public Safety office and to obtain the 
required identifying documentation,134 EICs were not completely without cost.   
The D.C. Federal District Court held that SB 14, if implemented, would have 
“a retrogressive effect on Hispanic and African American voters” in Texas, which 
is impermissible under the Voting Rights Act.135  In support of this holding, the 
court outlined three basic rationales and facts related to the implementation of SB 
14 in Texas: (a) a substantial subgroup of Texas voters,136 a large number of which 
are African American or Hispanic, lacked a photo ID; (b) the burdens associated 
with obtaining a photo ID weighed most heavily on the poor; and (c) racial 
minorities in Texas were disproportionately likely to live in poverty.137  Thus, the 
court held that SB 14 would likely impermissibly deny or abridge the right to vote 
on account of race, making it ineligible for preclearance under section 5 of the 
Voting Rights Act because of its likely discriminatory effect in Texas.138 
Shelby County breathed new life into the dispute over voter ID laws in Texas.  
Hours after Texas was no longer subject to federal preclearance under section 5 of 
the Voting Rights Act, the Texas Legislature swiftly moved forward to reenact SB 
                                                                                                     
 130. Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526, 538 (1973). 
 131. TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 63.0101 (West 2012).  The five forms of acceptable government-
issued photo identification include: (1) a Texas driver's license or personal ID card; (2) a Texas license 
to carry a concealed handgun; (3) a U.S. military ID card; (4) a U.S. citizenship certificate with 
photograph; or (5) a U.S. passport.  Id.   
 132. Id. 
 133. TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 521A.001(e) (West 2012). 
 134. SB 14 requires EIC applicants to present at least one of the following underlying forms of 
identification: (a) an expired Texas driver’s license or personal ID card, (b) an original or certified copy 
of a birth certificate, (c) U.S. citizenship or naturalization papers, or (d) a court order indicating a 
change of name and/or gender.  37 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 15.182 (2012). 
 135. Texas v. Holder, 888 F.Supp.2d. 113, 138 (D.D.C. 2012). 
 136. Texas submitted to the U.S. Attorney General a computer-generated list of 795,955 registered 
voters it was unable to match with corresponding entries in the Texas Department of Public Service's 
driver's license and personal ID database.  Texas estimated that this “no-match” list consisted of 
approximately 304,389 voters (38.2%) who were Hispanic and 491,566 (61.8%) who are non-Hispanic.  
Id. at 117.   
 137. Id. at 138.   
 138. Id. at 143-44.   
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14.139  In response, minority groups in Texas and the Department of Justice have 
asked a Texas court to return the state to federal preclearance requirements.140  As 
of the date of publication of this Comment, this challenge is still pending.   
V. RECENT TRENDS IN VOTER FRAUD 
A. The Myth of Voter Fraud 
Since the elections of 2000, only seven convictions have occurred for voter 
impersonation fraud in the United States.141  None of these convictions involved a 
conspiracy to commit voter impersonation fraud.142  In addition, a report published 
by the New York Times in 2007 revealed that election fraud was extremely rare, 
finding that an aggressive five-year investigation into voter fraud by the Bush 
Administration’s Department of Justice resulted in only eighty-six convictions of 
any kind of election crime throughout the country.143  Tellingly, in researching his 
book, “The Voting Wars,” Richard Hasen reported that he could not find a single 
case since 1980 when “an election outcome could plausibly have turned on voter-
impersonation fraud.”144  After years of painstaking research, Lorraine Minnite 
confirmed that voter fraud is rare in the United States, describing the concept of 
voter fraud as “a politically constructed myth.”145    
One such example of voter fraud was exposed during the 2012 election season 
in the important swing state of Florida.  In August 2012, Florida resident Josef 
Sever pleaded guilty to illegally voting in the November 4, 2008, presidential 
election.146  Born in Austria, Sever is a Canadian citizen, and admitted to 
registering and voting in at least two presidential elections.147  His conviction of 
illegal voting represented the only case of immigrant voter fraud being investigated 
by Florida state law enforcement in 2012.148  Sever’s illegal voting was discovered 
during Florida Governor Rick Scott’s controversial effort to purge non-citizens 
from Florida’s voting rolls by using information from Florida’s motor vehicle 
                                                                                                     
 139. Sarah Childress, With Voting Rights Act Out, States Push Voter ID Laws, FRONTLINE (June 26, 
2013, 2:58 PM), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/government-elections-politics/with-voting-
rights-act-out-states-push-voter-id-laws.  In addition to Texas, South Carolina, Alabama, Virginia, and 
Mississippi have either passed or have expressed interest in passing voter ID laws now that they no 
longer require federal preclearance.  Id.   
 140. Adam Liptak & Charlie Savage, U.S. Asks Court to Limit Texas on Ballot Rules, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 25, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/26/us/holder-wants-texas-to-clear-voting-changes-
with-the-us.html. 
 141. Jane Mayer, The Voter Fraud Myth, THE NEW YORKER, Oct. 29, 2012, 
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2012/10/29/121029fa_fact_mayer. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Eric Lipton & Ian Urbina, In 5-Year Effort, Scant Evidence of Voter Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 
12, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/12/washington/12fraud.html. 
 144. Mayer, supra note 141. 
 145. LORRAINE C. MINNITE, THE MYTH OF VOTER FRAUD 6 (2010). 
 146. Toluse Olorunnipa, Canadian Man Living in Broward Pleads Guilty to Voting Illegally in ‘08 
Presidential Election, MIAMI HERALD, Aug. 30, 2012, http://www.miamiherald.com/2012/08/30/ 
2977205/canadian-man-living-in-broward.html. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
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agency.149  Despite the fact that Florida’s Department of State amassed a list of 
180,000 potential non-citizens registered to vote in Florida, the Department only 
sent Josef Sever’s name to the Florida Department of Law Enforcement to conduct 
a criminal investigation.150  Outside of Governor Scott’s effort to purge Florida’s 
voting rolls of registered non-citizens, in 2012 the Florida Department of Law 
Enforcement reported that it was investigating, in a state of more than eleven 
million registered voters, a total of six cases of potential voter fraud.151 
Interestingly, the case of Josef Sever in Florida is a type of voter fraud that 
could not have been avoided with the implementation of a strict voter identification 
requirement.  As a registered voter in Florida, Sever would have still been eligible 
to vote on election day.  The reason for this is because he had unlawfully registered 
himself as a voter in Florida, which means that all he had to do to receive a ballot 
on election day was to show photo identification that he was the registered voter on 
Florida’s voting rolls.  Thus, a strict voter identification law in Florida would not 
have prevented Josef Sever, one of the few people to have committed voter fraud in 
the United States, from fraudulently voting in two presidential elections.   
B. Negative Effects of Voter Identification Laws  
According to a study conducted by the Brennan Center for Justice, eleven 
percent of the voting age population lacks the type of voter identification cards 
required to vote in the states with the strictest voter identification laws.152  This 
population of eligible voters who nevertheless do not have proper documentation in 
these states includes twenty-five percent of African Americans, sixteen percent of 
Hispanics, and eighteen percent of Americans over the age of sixty-five.153  In 
contrast, only nine percent of eligible white voters do not have proper photo 
identification.154   
Another study, conducted by Cathy Cohen of the University of Chicago and 
Jon Rogowski of Washington University prior to the 2012 presidential election, 
predicted that the rise of voter identification laws since the 2008 election would 
have a negative impact on voter turnout for young people of color aged 18-29.155  
Overall, the study estimated that up to twenty-five percent of eligible young voters 
of color between the ages of eighteen and twenty-nine could become demobilized 
by new voter identification laws, which would account for a decrease in voter 
participation ranging from 538,000 to 696,000 votes compared to turnout figures 
from the previous two presidential elections.156  In addition, the study cited three 
races in the U.S. House of Representatives among the several that could by affected 
by the “disproportionate demobilization” of young minorities from state voter 
identification laws, including Georgia’s 12th District, Pennsylvania’s 6th District, 
                                                                                                     
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. GASKINS & IYER, supra note 4, at 1. 
 153. Id. at 2. 
 154. Sonya Ross, Study: ID Laws Could Trip Up Young Minority Voters, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Sept. 
12, 2012, 2:53 AM, http://bigstory.ap.org/article/study-id-laws-could-trip-young-minority-voters. 
 155. Id.   
 156. Id. 
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and Tennessee’s 9th District.157 
Several factors may explain why a disproportionate percentage of young 
minorities do not have a proper form of photo identification required by strict state 
voter identification laws.  First and foremost, state voter identification laws have 
strict requirements for which forms of photo identification are allowed.158  Marc 
Morial, President of the National Urban League, described state voter identification 
laws as, “not about having ID.  [These are] about having a specific type of ID.  You 
can’t show up with your Sam’s Club card and vote.”159  For example, young 
minority voters tend to be poorer and more transient, which means they are less 
likely to have a current address on their driver’s licenses or other forms of 
identification.160  Driver’s licenses are also easily suspended or revoked due to 
unpaid fines.161  Finally, for those voters who do not have photo identification, it 
can be extremely difficult to pull together the necessary documentation to obtain a 
valid form of photo identification, which may also present additional administrative 
hurdles and costs to the voter.162   
VI. RECOMMENDATION AND CONCLUSION 
A. Articulating a Meaningful Standard of Review 
A better defined standard is needed to provide guidance to states in drafting 
election laws that do not create an undue burden on qualified voters.  Blind 
adherence to the notion that the state’s interest in preventing voter fraud is the sole 
means of protecting the integrity and reliability of a state’s elections does not serve 
as a useful guide to the states.  Voter ID laws are not the sole means of protecting 
voter confidence in the democratic process.  In fact, no evidence exists that 
universal voter identification requirements would actually raise public confidence 
in the electoral process.163  Thus, at the very least the balancing test favored in 
Crawford should not be so lopsided that the burdens imposed by voter ID laws are 
largely downplayed or ignored.   
In addition, the Court’s rationale in Crawford relied heavily on the availability 
of provisional ballots as an alternative for Indiana voters lacking appropriate photo 
identification at the polls, making Indiana’s law a model for states seeking to enact 
voter ID requirements.  However, two concerns remain about the deterrent effect of 
this alternative.  First, evidence from the polls in Indiana suggests that a majority of 
voters who cast provisional ballots due to lack of appropriate photo identification 
                                                                                                     
 157. Id. 
 158. See, e.g., WENDY R. WEISER & LAWRENCE NORDEN, VOTING LAW CHANGES IN 2012 5-6 
(Brennan Center for Justice ed., 2011). 
 159. Ross, supra note 154.   
 160. Id. 
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 163. Stephen Ansolabehere & Nathaniel Persily, Vote Fraud in the Eye of the Beholder: The Role of 
Public Opinion in the Challenge to Voter Identification Requirements, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1737, 1759 
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do not return to have their provisional ballots counted.164  Second, even with this 
alternative for voters without IDs, the risk of misinformation and voter intimidation 
still exists.  Eligible voters who lack the appropriate photo identification could be 
afraid that they will be turned away from the polls, or worse, that they could be 
prosecuted for attempting to commit voter fraud.  For example, in upholding a 
Tennessee statute barring political posters or signs within 100 feet of polling 
places, the Supreme Court recognized that preventing voter intimidation was a 
compelling governmental interest.165  Eligible voters continue to experience 
burdens under voter ID laws with the provisional balloting alternative, and are still 
likely to be disenfranchised by these laws.       
It is also important to note that the administration of elections in the United 
States is not immune to partisan influences.  In many cases, state and local election 
officials “are either elected in partisan elections as Democrats or Republicans, or 
are appointed and supervised by partisans.”166  Richard Hasen likens the 
management of U.S. elections to “allowing the foxes to guard the henhouse.”167  
Because the United States lacks an independent and impartial body to administer 
elections, courts must act to protect the rights of voters in the face of partisan 
influences affecting the electoral process for political gain.  The Crawford 
standard, however, provides inadequate protection to these essential democratic 
rights. 
Courts should instead use a standard of review that actually takes into equal 
consideration the interests of the state and the burdens on eligible voters.  The 
balancing approach of Crawford is inadequate because it fails to account for the 
interests and burdens asserted by weighing the number of eligible voters estimated 
to be disenfranchised by the law against the estimated impact of eliminating voter 
fraud.  A one-by-one comparison of the estimated number of fraudulent votes 
prevented against the estimated number of eligible voters disenfranchised is not 
inconsistent with the important role voting and elections play in the democratic 
process.  Instead of applying the Crawford balancing test, the Supreme Court 
should apply a heightened scrutiny standard to new laws dealing with voter 
qualifications.  While strict scrutiny could make it difficult for states to make 
changes to election laws, the use of intermediate scrutiny for changes to state 
election laws is a way of balancing the competing interests of preserving voting 
integrity and preventing voter disenfranchisement.  Heightened scrutiny seems 
especially apt given the fact that the Crawford balancing test upheld Indiana’s voter 
ID law despite Indiana’s inability to point to a single instance of in-person voter 
impersonation fraud in its entire history.168   
Indiana’s fantasy with voter fraud is not unique.  As discussed above, voter 
fraud is almost non-existent in the United States.  The vast majority of states that 
have enacted photo ID laws as a means of combatting voter fraud have yet to 
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actually experience any voter fraud, and have no indications that voter fraud is 
likely to become a problem in the future.  For this reason, state legislation requiring 
photo identification at the polls is a solution in search of a problem.   
In addition, states with photo identification laws that offer free photo 
identification to registered voters require them to provide copies of official 
documents that are costly and burdensome to acquire.  For example, Pennsylvania 
voters need to provide an original copy of their birth certificate and a proof of 
address to apply for photo identification issued free of charge by the State of 
Pennsylvania.  As the commonwealth court noted on remand in Applewhite, 
Pennsylvania had failed to issue a sufficient amount of photo IDs to registered 
voters in time for the 2012 General Election despite its statutory campaign of 
providing free photo IDs to the registered voters of Pennsylvania.169  Thus, despite 
the commonwealth court’s lengthy justification of Pennsylvania’s voter ID law, 
which relied heavily on U.S. Supreme Court precedent, the court nevertheless was 
not convinced that implementation of the voter ID law for the 2012 general election 
would not disenfranchise a large portion of Pennsylvania’s electorate.170   
While the Court in Crawford minimized the burden on voters needing to travel 
to their closest State Bureau of Motor Vehicles to receive a photo identification, the 
costs involved with the so-called “free” photo identification provided by the states 
have significant constitutional ramifications.  Dissenting in Crawford, Justice 
Breyer argued that the costs of obtaining the underlying documentation to qualify 
for Indiana’s “free” photo identification could be considered by some as unduly 
burdensome.171  In 1966, the Court held in Harper that a poll tax of $1.50 was 
unconstitutionally burdensome,172 which, adjusted for inflation, would be 
approximately $10 today.173  In Indiana, the cost of obtaining a birth certificate in 
2008 was $12.174   
The only way to prevent “free” state-issued photo identification from being 
considered a poll-tax is to either remove the birth certificate requirement or provide 
birth certificates free of charge.  Both of these options are problematic, however, 
because removing the birth certificate requirement could potentially allow 
noncitizen residents to obtain voter identification, and residents born out of state 
would still need to pay a fee to obtain their birth certificates.   
B. Conclusion 
Harper solidified the notion that voting is a fundamental right under the U.S. 
Constitution.175  As a fundamental right, voting receives special protection from 
federal and state legislation by “a more exacting judicial scrutiny.”176  Instead of 
relying solely on a patchwork of state constitutional rights, the right to vote is also 
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protected under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.177  
Voting rights in the United States should not differ based on where citizens live – 
our system of federalism does not allow for state experimentation with the 
fundamental rights of its citizens.  Crawford’s balancing approach gives too much 
power to the states to enact legislation that impinges upon voting rights. 
The Supreme Court has recognized the important role voting plays in the 
democratic process.  Indeed, voting is integral to our nation’s ability to function as 
a true democracy.  Voter ID laws have the potential to significantly interfere with 
our nation’s democratic process, and as such should be scrutinized with a more 
meaningful standard of review than the one articulated by the Court in Crawford. 
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